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Hispano-Moroccan Mimesis in the Spanish War on Tetouan and its 
Occupation (1859-62)1  
Abstract 
The ‘War of Africa’/‘War of Tetouan’ (1859-60) and the subsequent Spanish 
occupation of Tetouan (1860-62) have commonly been considered the landmark 
of the end of Morocco’s independence. While it is hardly arguable that Spain 
achieved to consolidate its position in Morocco throughout the second half of the 
nineteenth century thanks to the favorable conditions established in the treaties 
that followed the end of the war, the goal of this article is to nuance the 
reification of the power of the colonizers and the powerlessness of the colonized 
that many historiographical narratives have purported. I will concentrate on the 
initial stage of the occupation of Tetouan, and will illustrate the political 
transformation that took place among the Spaniards who were on the ground. 
Although I will mainly rely on Spanish sources, I will highlight the ways in 
which Makhzan diplomacy, Tetouani common people, and local notions and 
practices shaped such transformation by contributing to create and expand the 
anxieties and obstacles that permeated the Spanish colonization. I argue that the 
Spaniards who were on the ground increasingly empathized, self-identified, and 
admired Moroccans, and constructed Hispano-Moroccan analogy and similarity. 
Such colonial mimesis, performed by the Spanish colonizers, went hand in hand 
with the perception of Moroccans as unyielding, which led the Spanish to admit 
the difficulty, even impossibility, of their colonialist venture.   
Keywords 
Agency; colonization; mimesis; Spain; Morocco; Tetouan  
                                                 
1 I would like to extend my sincere gratitude to Eric Calderwood and David Stenner for their 
thorough revision and suggestions. 
This is the accepted version of a forthcoming article that will be published by Taylor & Francis in 
Journal of North African Studies:  
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/25444/  
 
3 
 
Introduction 
After weeks of unsuccessful diplomatic conversations, Spain officially declared 
war on Morocco on October 22, 1859. The negotiations had followed a reported 
aggression against a Spanish post in Ceuta by members of the Anjira tribe in August. 
Similar contentions had occurred in the previous decade against the backdrop of Spain’s 
will to extend its control in Morocco to gain commercial trade shares and to legitimize its 
power vis-à-vis other European nations present in Morocco, particularly France which 
colonized Algeria since 1830 (Garrido Quijano 2014, 82–93). Sultan ‘Abd al-Raḥmān’s 
death on August 22, 1859 proved beneficial to advance Spain’s interests and, even if the 
commander in chief of the so-called Army of Africa, Leopoldo O’Donnell, declared the 
mission did not have “a conquest spirit,” the flag-waving peninsular press and politicians 
hastened to encourage the Spanish troops’ advancement beyond Tetouan, which was 
seized on February 6, 1860.  
The armed conflict took place in the territory between Ceuta and the plain of Wad 
Ras, yet in Spain the setting of the war was written and spoken about as a synecdoche for 
the whole African continent, as the locution ‘war of Africa’ shows. In Morocco, the 
Arabic and Tamazight names given to the conflict translate as ‘the war of Tetouan’ 
(Ricard 1968, 5). Spanish and Moroccan historiographies have generally maintained such 
denominations, although several scholars have suggested alternative terms (Martínez 
Antonio 2010; Calderwood 2011). In this article, I will use the name ‘Spanish war on 
Tetouan.’ Firstly, because what happened was a unilateral Spanish militarized aggression 
(hence the selection of the preposition ‘on’) rather than a proper bilaterally-enhanced 
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armed conflict, and secondly, because to name a war that took place in a restricted area 
of northern Morocco after the whole African continent responds, as the war did, to 
colonialist concepts that take shape through language. 2   
The peacemaking negotiations began five days after Tetouan was seized, lasting 
for more than a month and a half, and concluding in the preliminary signature of the 
Treaty of Wad Ras on March 26, 1860. This article will concentrate on this initial stage 
of the Spanish occupation of Tetouan, in which the Spaniards who were on the ground 
steadily transformed their political stances. Ultimately, my twofold goal is to nuance the 
reification of the power of the colonizers and the powerlessness of the colonized 
purported by the historiographical narratives which have located the beginning of the end 
of Morocco’s independence at the Spanish war on Tetouan; and to emphasize the role that 
Moroccan and specially Tetouani people, notions, and practices played in the 
occupational discourses and policies.  
As a consequence of the influence that different categories of Moroccan people 
and politics had on them, the Spaniards who were in Tetouan in the initial stage of the 
occupation steadily softened their preliminary warmongering and boastful cries. They 
ceased to perceive Tetouanis as ‘the enemy’ (at least exclusively), and they turned to 
acknowledge their colonial limitations. The gradual and multifaceted transformation 
which took place among those military and civilian Spaniards is observable in their steady 
                                                 
2 Although Tetouani historian Abdelaziz Assaoud has referred to the war in different ways, his choice in 
one of his papers is similar to mine. See Assaoud 2010. 
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emphasis on Hispano-Moroccan similarity. Although the literature on colonial mimesis 
and mimicry has mostly conceived of it as a subaltern strategy displayed by the colonized 
(Taussig 1993; Bhabha 1997), I contend that during the initial stage of the occupation of 
Tetouan it was the Spanish ‘conquistadors’ who mimicked the Moroccan colonized. They 
did so as a result of their increasing empathy, self-identification and admiration of 
Moroccans, especially Muslim Tetouani men, whom they came to conceive as 
‘unyielding.’  
Mimesis has been variously conceptualized across disciplines.3 Essentially, 
mimesis is the representation of sameness, and has difference as its governing principle 
(Kelly 1998, III: 237). This simple definition points to two key concepts, sameness and 
difference, and to their interrelatedness. Mimesis thus becomes key in both the 
construction of the radically different Other as well as in the challenging of it. This article 
will argue that Moroccan people and notions influenced Spaniards in such way that a 
transition can be noted from Spaniards’ highlighting of Hispano-Moroccan difference to 
their increasing emphasis on similarity, affinity, and self-identification, on the one hand, 
and on their reproduction, appropriation and ventriloquization of Moroccans’ claims, 
which shows the credibility and authority that the latter inspired to the occupiers, on the 
other hand. 
                                                 
3 See, for example, Farneti 2015; Palaver 2013; Polat 2012; Fuchs 2001; Irigaray 1996; Taussig 1993; and 
Contagion: Journal of Violence, Mimesis, and Culture since 1994. 
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This article will look at the Spanish side of the conflict and will mainly rely on 
Spanish sources, but it will highlight the decisive role that Moroccans played in shaping 
the political transformation that can be seen in and through the Spanish texts. Although I 
will also point at other texts and authors, I will principally focus on Pedro Antonio de 
Alarcón and his 800-page Diary of a Witness of the War of Africa, which became a best-
seller in the context of the patriotic fervor which overcame the Spanish peninsula with 
the announcement of the war. Born in 1833 in Guadix (Granada), Alarcón was a 
seminarian during his childhood and youth. Having abandoned the ecclesiastic domain, 
he moved to Madrid in 1854, where he founded an antimonarchist and revolutionary 
paper. Later on, Alarcón discarded liberal ideas. From 1875 on, he held different positions 
within O’Donnell’s La Unión Liberal, both in Spain and abroad (Romano 1933).  
Alarcón’s work has been studied by many scholars, who have mostly looked at 
his jingoistic nationalistic and imperialistic cries. Some scholars, as Morales Lezcano 
(2004), have mentioned that he turned to pacifist positions towards the end of his stay in 
Tetouan without, however, explaining what might have driven him to do so. For her part, 
Susan Martín-Márquez has contended that his change in attitude was related to his 
religiously inflected colonial ideology, and that “Alarcón’s call for war [wa]s lowered 
when he underst[ood] Jewish and Muslim will not convert [to Christianity] (…) [and] he 
must abandon the theatre of war in order to avoid his own dramatization of colonial 
conquest” (2008, 112–13). In my opinion, such interpretations fail to place the text in its 
context and consequently brand the discursive fractures that permeate Alarcón’s Diary as 
eccentricities. Instead, my goal is to dispel linear or homogenizing depictions of both the 
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texts and the complex historical subjects which produced them, and to explain such 
transformations.  
Notwithstanding, while the mimesis of the Spaniards who were influenced by 
Moroccan people and politics certainly presented subversive and threatening stands with 
regards to the Spanish state and especially liberal colonialist sectors, the restraint that they 
advocated was beneficial for the Spanish colonial project in Morocco. These Spaniards’ 
pragmatism ultimately enabled the signature of the treaties that followed the war, which 
eventually eased the Spanish colonial penetration into Morocco in the second half of the 
nineteenth century. The 1860 Treaty of Wad Ras led to the establishment of new borders 
in which Spain gained territory, to new commercial agreements that were favorable for 
the Spanish, and it eased the reinforcement of the presence of Spanish Catholics in 
northern Morocco (Cagigas 1952). Besides, the Spanish occupation of Tetouan was 
redefined as a temporary warranty until the Morocco would have paid the war indemnity 
of 20 million reales but, as the Makhzan was unable to pay the sum, the new treaties 
signed throughout 1861 established the Spanish – and British – intervention of eight 
customs offices in coastal Morocco, which continued until the mid-1880s (Rodríguez 
Esteller 2002).  
It is not my aim, therefore, to deny that Spain consolidated its influence in the 
Morocco throughout the second half of the nineteenth century thanks to the favorable 
conditions established in the treaties that followed the end of the war on Tetouan, as it 
has widely been considered. Rather, my goal is to show that the Spaniards faced 
colonizing difficulties and, especially, that the Spanish occupation of Tetouan was the 
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outcome of a complex negotiation, in which Moroccan and especially Tetouani people, 
notions, and practices played a vital role.  
The Capture of Tetouan: Imperial Grandiloquence and the Recreation of 
Reconquista 
Vast crowds of Tetouani people carrying their furniture and possessions stretched 
out along the routes of exile on the eve and immediately after the Spanish capture of 
Tetouan. After the Moroccan breakdown in the so-called Battle of Tetouan, the political 
and religious authorities pushed for Tetouan to be emptied before the Spanish seizure (Ibn 
Khālid al-Nāṣirī 1997, 9:90). Tetouani Muslims and Jews fled to Chefchaouen, Tangier, 
Gibraltar, El-Ksar el-Kebir and the villages in the surrounding northern Moroccan rural 
lands, and some also settled in neighbouring Algeria and the southern Spanish coastal 
towns (Daoud 1964a, V:227–31; Vilar 1985, 50). Although some Tetouanis remained in 
and others entered the city temporarily while the Spanish were in control, the majority of 
the population did not return home until the Spanish Forces of the Occupation had 
evacuated the city in May 1862.   
The fluttering of the Spanish flag on top of the citadel of al-Manẓari, named after 
the leader of the exiled Andalusis who had re-established Tetouan in the fifteenth century, 
signaled the Spanish capture of the city on February 6, 1860. The whole Army of Africa, 
scattered in different locations, celebrated the feat to the sound of the music played by the 
military orchestra. Pedro Antonio de Alarcón, the chronicler who allegedly took up arms 
driven by his patriotism during the war, wrote in his memoirs: 
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Tetouan for Spain! (…) [I proffer] a hymn of gratitude and praise to God as 
Columbus offered [it] in the Antilles, Cortés in the Andes, Balboa as he discovered 
the Pacific sea, Gama in Calcutta, and Magallanes in the Philippines; this cheer of 
triumph, glory and fortune will reverberate now in the whole universe, and it will 
awake the echoes of our name which still roam all over, in all the latitudes and all 
the continents through which our armies went awhile; and from America, Flanders, 
France, Germany and the whole of Italy, Greece, Constantinople, Asia and farther 
Oceania, from all the towns and cities in which the Spanish blood ran and in which 
the ashes of our ancestors rest a glorious sleep, will turn their sight onto Spain 
(Alarcón 1860, 430–31). 
Alarcón’s proclamation, as other contemporaries’, established a link between the past 
Iberian imperial ‘glories’ and the 1860 Spanish victory over Tetouan. The chronicler’s 
jingoistic cheers, similar to the main discourses which had arisen with the campaign 
propaganda, show that the war on Morocco was a balm to the imperial anxieties that 
permeated mid nineteenth-century Spanish discourses. Especially after the ‘loss’ of the 
majority of the American colonies in the past decades, the seizure of Tetouan came to 
confirm the “illusion of a new kind of colonialism” (Fradera 2002, 10). Alarcón’s 
emphasis on the worldly admiration that the Spanish capture of Tetouan would have 
stimulated also reveals that the war represented for Spain the chance to contradict the 
northern European questioning of its ‘civilization,’ its ability to colonize, and its very 
Europeanness.  
Other imperial resonances also permeated the occupied urban space of Tetouan, 
as the army plunged into altering the physiognomy of the city from the very outset of its 
capture. A number of streets and gates were renamed after both the early modern combats 
between Christians and Muslims in Iberia and the Reconquista. Bab Tūt and the sizeable 
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street that led to the gate were baptized after El Cid, an eleventh-century Castilian military 
leader appropriated as a Christian model warrior against the Muslims in their conquest of 
Iberia; and Bab al-Rumūz was named after the Catholic Kings.4 Sīdī ‘Abd-Allah al-
Baqāl’s zāwiya, located in the main square, was consecrated as a church under the name 
of Nuestra Señora de las Victorias (Our Lady of the Victories) as a tribute to the temple 
canonized by Cardinal Cisneros in sixteenth-century occupied Oran (Alarcón 1860, 569; 
Núñez de Arce 2003 [1860], 231). Cisneros had been the prominent advocate of 
Andalusis’ mass conversions, the burning of Arabic manuscripts in reconquered Granada, 
and colonial expansion in the Maghrib. 
The Reconquista provided a sound example of a precedent Christian victory 
against the Abode of Islam, and it was particularly suited on a local level because it arose 
the specter of the Reconquista that the ancestors of many Tetouanis had fled a few 
centuries before. Al-Andalus and the Reconquista also represented the cornerstones of 
the Spanish Africanism, whereby ‘Africa’ – mainly used as an eponym for Algeria and 
Morocco – had become the locus of the new Spanish imperial anxieties (Morales Lezcano 
2006). Especially after 1830, as France colonized Algeria and Spain ‘re-discovered’ its 
Andalusi past, Africanist theses advocated Spain’s ‘historical and geographical rights’ 
vis-à-vis other European powers to colonize Morocco.  
                                                 
4 A detailed list of the pre- and post-occupation names of Tetouani towers, gates, streets, mosques 
and other public places can be found in Daoud 1964a, V:321–24. 
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After having taken the military injured and choleric Spaniards to the Andalusian 
coast, the military doctor Nicasio Landa returned to occupied Tetouan, where he attended 
the inauguration of the church on February 12, 1860, and he asserted: “How could one 
not feel transported to the times of our ancestors, when they [Christians] conquered the 
cities of Andalucía [and] they consecrated to the Lord the mosques as though the first 
sign of victory (…)!” (Landa 1860, 166). Landa’s reflection is to be understood within 
the framework of the aforementioned illusion of a new colonial venture that ‘Africa’ 
represented for mid-century Spain, and which was depicted as a continuation of an old 
enterprise which had been put aside for centuries (in which Spain had focused on the 
Americas and the Philippines), and was now resumed.  
Encountering Moroccans On The Ground: Towards Hispano-Moroccan Mimesis 
The prompt construction works that the Forces of the Occupation of Tetouan 
carried out indicates the urgent need that the Spaniards had to leave the imprint of their 
capture of Tetouan. As the colonial top-down initiatives developed, several processes led 
to a political transformation of those who were on the ground. Moroccan and specifically 
Tetouani people, notions and practices were not alien to these multi-layered processes, 
but on the contrary represented active agents of such transformation and thus of the course 
of the events which inaugurated Spanish colonialism in Morocco. 
The Tug of War with the Makhzan Diplomats 
The four emissaries acting on behalf of the Prince Mawlay al-‘Abbās approached 
the Spanish chief Leopoldo O’Donnell’s general headquarters five days after Tetouan was 
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occupied. Different encounters took place in the weeks to follow. In the second one, on 
February 16, the Makhzan diplomats met with outrage Queen Isabel II’s provision to 
incorporate Tetouan to the Spanish domains. The diplomats and Mawlay al-‘Abbās 
himself vehemently opposed the queen’s condition, and used different strategies to coerce 
Spaniards that it was not in their interest for Tetouan to become Spanish.  
After celebrating that second meeting in the outskirts of Tetouan, the emissaries 
requested to spend the night in Tetouan. In the afternoon, General Ríos took them around 
the occupied city to the newly established office of the electric telegraph and the 
Administration ovens, where he elucidated the technical devices introduced into Tetouan 
and presented the Spaniards as the harbingers of technological modernity. Far from 
showing interest, the envoys alluded to the British occupation of Gibraltar (ongoing since 
1713), a particularly sensitive issue for the Spaniards, which encapsulated the status of 
Spain as a second-order world power (Alarcón 1860, 587). The diplomats are likely to 
have aimed at reminding the Spaniards of the British backing of the Makhzan, which 
included the British supply and training of the Moroccan army. 
On February 23, the representative of the sultan to the foreign powers, the 
Tetouani Muḥammad al-Khatīb, categorically rejected the incorporation of Tetouan to 
Spain. Al-Khatīb, who in the past weeks had led the negotiations to purchase British 
military supplies (Ibn Zaydān 1929, III: 492–95), asserted that “Europe w[ould] not 
consent it” (Alarcón 1860, 615–16). Al-Khatīb’s powerful and concise affirmation 
implied that Spain was not European and, as such, it was a clear allusion to the northern 
European allegations on Spain’s ‘uncivilized’ character, which delegitimized its colonial 
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ambitions in Morocco. The Makhzan’s coercion strategies partly consisted in raising 
elements related to Spain’s status as a second-order world power. The envoys of Mawlay 
al-‘Abbās mobilized other issues, too. 
In the evening of February 16, the emissaries were invited to a soirée held at 
notable Aḥmad al-Razīni’s mansion, where General Ríos had lodged. After some 
informal talk, the emissaries assured that the Spanish keeping of Tetouan heightened the 
risk of a civil war in Morocco. The interpreter and diplomat Aḥmad b. ‘Ali Aba‘yīr, who 
had already been appointed president of the Muslim councilors of the mixed city council, 
addressed the Spaniards to clarify what the emissaries were suggesting: 
If the emperor (…) loses Tetouan, the parties overthrow the emperor, and if they 
overthrow the emperor, there will be a civil war in Morocco, and disorder and 
anarchy for many years, and you will have no one to address, and even if you 
address some, the others will not accomplish, and you will be compelled to keep 
fighting forever with no result whatsoever (Alarcón 1860, 594). 
There were at least three ‘Alawi rival claimants to the throne that the new sultan Sīdī 
Muḥammad had come to hold after his father’s death less than six months before, and the 
Moroccan population was increasingly divided. ‘Abd al-Raḥmān b. Sulaymān posed the 
toughest threat, as he was finding support among the Berber tribes of southern Fes. 
Moreover, the sultan’s elder brother was rising up in the south and trying to reach 
Marrakech (Martínez Antonio 2010, 73). Sīdī Muḥammad’s reputation had been 
tarnished at the 1844 defeat in the Battle of Isly against the French, while Sīdī Muḥammad 
b. ‘Abd-Allah, who had been in active support of the jihād party against the French in 
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western Algeria, was calling for jihād against the Spanish in the northeast of Morocco 
(Bennison 2002, 121–23). 
The Moroccan envoys utilized and probably maximized the menace of the rival 
claimants to the throne in order to limit the conditions that the Spaniards were trying to 
impose, particularly the unacceptable incorporation of Tetouan to the Spanish domains. 
My point is not to insinuate that the claimants to the throne did not actually exist, but 
rather that the phantom of the ‘civil war’ was strategically and productively arisen by the 
Makhzan emissaries. As Thérèse Benjelloun (1991) and Mourad Zarrouk (2009) have 
held, Makhzan diplomacy historically displayed a wide variety of dissuasive tactics that 
included stressing and even exaggerating internal disunity.  
Besides, Alarcón’s narrative suggests that Moroccan urbanites, both the envoys 
and the Tetouani folk, mobilized the supposedly “fierce” character of rural tribes as a 
threat to the Spanish. In the first encounters, the Makhzan envoys exonerated themselves 
from the cruel war deeds, by arguing that it had been the “fierce tribes” who had 
committed them (Alarcón, 1860, 559). Alarcón wrote in his Diary that both Muslim and 
Jewish Tetouanis assured that the condition of incorporating Tetouan to Spanish domains 
would never be accepted by the Makhzan. Even if it was, he continued, “all the tribes of 
the empire will surround Tetouan (…) and will harass us day and night” (Alarcón 1860, 
585). 
Thus, the Moroccan diplomats employed external and internal elements to 
dissuade the Spaniards from their colonialist ambitions. Their explicit and implicit 
references to Great Britain hinted at the British opposition to the Spanish venture, and at 
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its formal and military support of the Makhzan. Moreover, the Makhzan envoys and the 
Tetouani population who had remained in the occupied city alluded to several other 
elements which jeopardized the Spanish permanence in Tetouan; namely the ‘ferocity’ of 
rural and tribal Moroccans, and the specter of a Moroccan civil strife provoked by the 
contentions among the ‘Alawi claimants to the throne.  
The strategic mobilization of tribal ‘ferocity’ was not only that, however. It was 
also the expression of the conflictual character of the relations between the rural and the 
urban realm, which encapsulated a historical and political cleavage in Morocco. Tetouan 
was, together with Fes, Rabat and Salé, among the Moroccan cities traditionally termed 
as ḥaḍārīyya for their being seats of Islamic culture and civilization, as opposed to 
Makhzan towns such as Tangier, Larache and Essaouira, which were seats of government 
or hosts to military garrisons (El Mansour 1990, 10). The ḥaḍārī, literally ‘civilized,’ 
status of Tetouan encapsulated concepts of urbanity, that of being seats of Islamic culture, 
and comprised of Andalusi descendants. Although Andalusi populations had also settled 
in rural parts of Morocco, many of those who integrated ḥaḍārīyya towns constituted the 
khāṣṣa, or the elite. Significantly, the elites of Moroccan (and Maghribi) urban centers 
were boastful of their Andalusi descent, born with an aura of refinement, culture, and 
urban ‘civilization,’ vis-à-vis the rural world.  
What this means, then, is that both the Makhzan diplomacy and the Tetouanis who 
remained in the occupied city argued that the rural and tribal populations constituted a 
menace to the Spaniards as a way to coerce them, but also because the representation of 
the rural ethos as ‘savage’ informed a longstanding construction in the Moroccan socio-
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political landscape. This article argues that the local people, notions and practices among 
the colonized were neither a-historical nor passive recipients of colonial dynamics and 
relations. It suggests that colonial knowledge and practice was not exclusively owned by 
the colonizers, but on the contrary was the result of various processes and actors – 
including the colonized – which converged in the framework of nineteenth-century 
imperialism.  
Encountering Common Tetouanis: Shared Humanity and Exceptional 
Unyieldingness 
As the negotiations between the politico-military leaders of both parties unfolded 
throughout February and the specter of the civil war and the ‘ferocity’ of tribal elements 
raised by the Makhzan officials and certain Tetouanis persuaded the Spaniards, their first-
hand experience in Tetouan also influenced their colonialist views. While especially 
during the first battles Alarcón poeticized violence and praised war as a heroic and 
enjoyable practice, from the moment in which he walked in the streets of the just captured 
Tetouan he began to empathize with the suffering of the Tetouanis. When he witnessed 
the evidence of the mass looting which had taken place before the Spanish seizure, he 
admitted that the Spanish were partly the cause of the destruction he contemplated.  
It was a pity to effectively contribute to the culmination of so much ravage, so 
much destruction. We had to a certain degree been the cause of such disasters, and 
far from commiserating with them – by lamenting them, perhaps – we heightened it 
with our devastating march. Each of those piles of ruins represented the fortune of 
a family, a fortune accumulated throughout long years of work, transmitted from 
parents to children and annihilated in [just] one moment (Alarcón 1860, 451).  
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This passage shows that the chronicler recognized that beneath the ruins over which he 
and the military personnel stepped might lie the result of the owners’ hard work and 
inheritance. By acknowledging the Spaniards’ responsibility in the perpetuation of the 
violence that hit the Tetouanis, Alarcón recognized the Tetouanis on the basis of their 
humanity and vulnerability vis-à-vis violence. Alarcón’s humanization of the Tetouanis 
ultimately entailed a sort of ‘human mimesis,’ or the construction of sameness in the 
human condition which the colonial discourses often denied (Norris 2000). The allocation 
of grievability – that is, who is and should be mourned – differentially was (and is) at the 
core of the exclusionary conception of humanity at work in the (re)production of violence 
(Butler 2004). 
Alarcón’s grieving and humanization of Tetouanis was part of a multi-facetted 
transformation that advocated some restraint to the colonial enterprise. Alarcón expressed 
pity when he imagined the affection that the Tetouani owners may have felt for and within 
what appeared to him as only waste, a feeling that requires a degree of empathy that can 
only arise if the idea of radical difference is somehow softened. And yet, the author from 
Granada did not perceive Tetouanis as victims in need of commiseration. On the contrary, 
he admired their resilient attitude. He exclaimed:   
Great silence, decent proudness, majestic indifference, heroic disdain. Oh! The 
attitude of these savages is sublime (…) Savages, I said, and the truth is that I 
cannot conceive more civilization than the one Muslims reveal (…) this 
indestructible superiority that their unblemished religious faith gives them (…) 
they exert their rational faculties with as much wisdom as Socrates and Cato, or as 
the Christian martyrs. All of this proves that Moors are unconquerable (…) They 
are neither fearful nor provocative. Their conviction that they will never be our 
slaves is sufficient to them. (Alarcón 1860, 527–28). 
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Alarcón rectified the adjective ‘savage’ that he firstly allocated to Muslims’ “silence,” 
“proudness” and “indifference,” and came to conceive their strength vis-à-vis the Spanish 
conquerors as the sign of their “civilization,” their “indestructible superiority,” “rational 
faculties,” and, climactically, their unconquerability. Captain Eduardo Soler y Ovejero 
provided similar insights in his Descriptive Memory of an Itinerary Project from Tetouan 
to al-Kasr and Fes, where he suggested that Muslims’ unyielding attitude toward their 
subjection to “civilized customs” made their colonization more difficult than that of “any 
other people” (Soler y Ovejero 1862, 57). For his part, the journalist Gaspar Núñez de 
Arce asserted that Moroccans’ “character,” which manifested in their “eloquent silence,” 
the “scowl” in their looks, and their “dignity,” was “worthy of consideration and respect” 
(Núñez de Arce 2003 [1860], 233).  
The attitudes that the Spaniards came to admire can be taken to embody different 
forms of inkimāsh or sorts of internal hijra, consistent on an “inward religio-spiritual 
movement or withdrawal employed by those Muslims who lacked the will or the means 
to depart from their homeland” (Clancy-Smith 1994, 7). As mentioned before, the 
political and religious authorities had urged Tetouanis to adopt hijra (migration) on the 
eve of the Spanish seizure. Those who did not abandon the city thus came to be considered 
as necessarily willing to co-operate with the Spaniards. Mufaḍḍal Afaylāl, a sharīf and 
well-known religious authority in Tetouan who held local and Makhzan authorities 
ultimately responsible for the Spanish occupation of the city, branded the notables and 
fuqahā’ who did not migrate out of occupied Tetouan “Christianized” (mutanāṣira) 
(Afaylāl, n.d., 35). Contradicting Afaylāl’s accusations, Mohamed Daoud’s influential 
work also conveyed the idea that Tetouanis chose by majority one path, which the 
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historian undoubtedly thought of as proof of Tetouanis’ political action against the 
Spanish occupation (Daoud 1964, IV:127). Instead, what the Spaniards’ writings show is 
that among those who remained in Tetouan there were some who adopted forms of 
internal exile, which can be seen as “means of coping and therefore of endurance,” of 
“safeguarding the potentialities of Islam” (Berque 1978, 419), and therefore as forms of 
political action.5  
The admiration that some Muslims’ inkimāsh arose among Spaniards significantly 
reinforced the idea of the difficulties that the colonial endeavor would have to face if the 
incorporation of Tetouan to the Spanish domains and the advancement in the Moroccan 
territory were to continue. The attitude of “passive resistance” displayed by some 
Tetouanis (Salazar 1860) bolstered the specter of the other menaces that the Makhzan 
envoys had raised; all of which became magnified with the suspension of the negotiations, 
the polarization of attitudes and the pressing siege of Tetouan sponsored by the Makhzan. 
The New Tugs of War: Consolidating Spanish Colonialism Through the 
Pragmatic Restraint Inspired by Moroccan People and Politics 
In view of the Makhzan’s opposition to the incorporation of Tetouan to Spain, 
Queen Isabel II ordered O’Donnell to suspend negotiations and resume the war. The 
queen commanded the recently appointed ‘Duke of Tetouan’ to continue the campaign to 
                                                 
5 Similar reactions to Algerians’ attitudes can be found in French military authorities’ writings. 
See Marnia Lazreg (1994, 24). 
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Tangier, and banned him from negotiating the evacuation of Tetouan (Burdiel 2010, 633). 
In peninsular Spain, the liberal press and the opposition parties continued to wave the 
bellicose calls which had bestowed them considerable political gain during the campaign. 
O’Donnell and the military officials, caught between those forces, decided to make use 
of a further tool to press Moroccans to accept the Spanish conditions, and on February 25 
and 26 the navy bombed the ports of Larache and Asilah. 
The Makhzan, for its part, sieged Tetouan. By the end of February and the 
beginning of March, as a consequence of the hostilities with the neighboring Busemeler 
tribe, Spanish soldiers were killed in the roads of the outskirts of Tetouan and within the 
city. In addition, a blockage on the entry of food supplies was imposed on the city. 
Members of the sultan’s ‘Abīd al-Bukhārī corps wandered in the outskirts of Tetouan to 
avoid anyone entering the city to provide supplies. Alarcón declared:  
There is no defense against this, (…) not even forty thousand soldiers established 
both in the inner and the outer side of this stronghold would be able to guarantee 
the life and the property of its inhabitant from the perfidy (or the patriotism!) of 
Muslims (…) Moors’ attitude with regards to the Spanish invasion is the same we 
adopted towards the French invasion –think of what happened back then in the 
peninsula and make a guess of what can happen to us in Africa (Alarcón 1860, 
620–21).  
Alarcón’s words show not only how different these declarations sound from his previous 
grandiloquent exclamations, but also reveal his admiration towards Moroccans’ attitude, 
and his blurring of Hispano-Moroccan differences by resorting to analogy. As with the 
previous citation, he preliminarily identified what the Spanish were unable to defend from 
as Muslims’ “perfidy,” which he immediately after conceived as the antithetic and 
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remarkably positively connoted term, i.e., patriotism (followed by an exclamation sign). 
Moreover, the chronicler went on to construct similarity between the Spanish and the 
Moroccans on the basis of patriotism, or resistance, against foreign occupiers, by referring 
to no less than the so-called War of Independence against the Napoleonic occupation of 
Spain (1808-1814). Rather than emphasizing difference, then, Alarcón gave way to a 
mimesis that recognized Hispano-Moroccan similarity, on the grounds of the fight against 
a foreign power’s occupation. 
In the increasingly tense political context in peninsular Spain, the defense of 
pacifist positions did not satisfy many sectors. The liberal newspaper La Iberia branded 
the chroniclers of war – including Alarcón and Núñez de Arce – the “apostles of peace.” 
Alarcón criticized the politicians in Madrid who dictated the way to proceed in the 
campaign and the peacemaking, and affirmed that they lacked knowledge of “what only 
having a close view can be understood” (Alarcón 1860, 561). For his part, General Prim, 
the hero of the campaign, addressed a letter to his politician colleagues, suggesting that 
those who waved the conquest thesis in the peninsula were “ignorant” (cited in: Burdiel 
2010, 635). Partly replicating the words of warning that the Moroccan authorities had 
pronounced during the various encounters, General Prim mentioned the many 
disadvantages and the few advantages that the incorporation of Tetouan into the Spanish 
monarchy would entail. 
Barbara Fuchs (2001, 39) has contended that the writers of the early modern 
Spanish chronicles which narrated the empire-building events claimed their authority 
insofar as eyewitnesses who “saw” what happened “in reality,” and opposed it to the 
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“imagination” that supposedly shaped peninsular Spanish subjects’ understanding of 
what imperialism entailed. By the same token, the first-hand experience that these civilian 
and military Spaniards lived (including their exposure to Moroccan diplomats’ and 
common Tetouanis’ claims and attitudes) was what drove them to self-identify, 
empathize, and admire Moroccans to highlight familiarity, sameness, and to trace 
analogies in history and behavior, and ultimately advocate restraint in the colonialist 
enterprise. On his way to peninsular Spain, where he aimed at fighting the new battles 
against the peninsular conquest fervor, Alarcón insisted that “the war of Africa, after 
having forged the glory of the nation w[ould] end up, if it [went] on, causing its wreck” 
(Alarcón 1860, 673). 
On March 11, as the Army of Africa finally advanced toward Tangier, a bloody 
battle took place in the plain of Samsa against some newly arrived Rifian contingents. 
The day after the Moroccan defeat, the emissaries of Mawlay al-‘Abbās approached the 
Spanish camp. They apologized for the attack of the Rifians which, they held, 
contradicted Mawlay al-‘Abbās’ orders. The “Rifian warriors” were said to have ignored 
the warning of the prince of the blood, after having condemned Mawlay al-‘Abbās’ 
unwillingness to fight the ‘infidels’ as cowardice (Alarcón 1860, 659–60). O’Donnell 
proceeded to ask the queen to reconsider the incorporation of Tetouan into the Spanish 
lands, and the new provision established that Tetouan would be occupied until the war 
indemnity was completed. But negotiations were once again suspended after the 
Moroccan delegates refused the temporary occupation of Tetouan. 
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The march to Tangier was resumed on the eve of the beginning of the holy month 
of Ramadan of the year 1276 of the hijrī calendar, March 23 of the Gregorian calendar. 
The Moroccan army prevented Spaniards’ advance across the plain of Wad Ras, where 
yet another bloody battle took place. Mawlay al-‘Abbās demanded another encounter, 
and shortly after requested to postpone it due to the praying prescriptions of Ramadan. 
The Makhzan’s “diplomacy of wearing down” (Zarrouk 2009, 26) continued by blaming 
the “fierce” Rifian countrymen for any attack, and by endeavoring to postpone the 
encounters by alleging religious duties. Eventually, the conference took place two days 
later, when the preliminary peace treaty was signed on March 25, 1860. The official 
ratification would take place a month later, on April 26, two months and twenty days after 
Tetouan was occupied. 
The Spanish opposition parties, in their struggle against the figure of O’Donnell 
and his La Unión Liberal, insisted on the insignificant gain that such a bombastically 
enhanced war provided for Spain, and they coined the maxim ‘the great war of petty 
peace.’ O’Donnell, in keeping track of the occupation and the further complications that 
continued to arise in Tetouan, kept fighting the dialectical wars in a parliamentary battle. 
In June 1860, he replied to deputy González Bravo’s plea in the Spanish Cortes by making 
the Makhzan envoys’ words his own: 
Does Your Honor know why I renounced the capture of Tangier? Because the 
occupation of Tangier would have involved overthrowing the Moroccan sultan, and 
a civil war would have erupted in Morocco. And this, which seems a great 
advantage to us, entailed a major disadvantage; I do not know where it could have 
led us. On the day in which no government had existed in Morocco an eternal war 
would have begun against that empire, during which our convoys would have been 
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intercepted, our detachments attacked; we would have been harassed and obliged to 
fight. How long? This I know not (cited in: Garrido Quijano 2014, 241–42). 
The Spanish war on Tetouan that the party of O’Donnell had put on in an attempt to 
achieve the party’s governmental consolidation turned out, in the end, to represent a threat 
to it. In the aftermath of the peacemaking, the very colonial expectations that the 
warmongering discourses had contained before and during the campaign stimulated the 
re-emergence of disunity among the multiple Spanish political and social fractions. As 
the ‘apostles of peace’ and General Prim, O’Donnell ventriloquized the Makhzan 
diplomats’ warnings, which the attitudes of some common Tetouanis and the difficulties 
that the Makhzan’s siege of Tetouan had strengthened.  
Conclusion 
The main twofold goal of the article has been to nuance the idea that the Spanish 
colonizers had unlimited power and the Moroccan colonized had no or little scope of 
action; and to highlight the critical role that Moroccan and specifically Tetouani people, 
notions, and practices played in shaping the colonial processes and rule. For that end, the 
article has traced the political transformation of the Spaniards who were on the ground 
during the preliminary stage of the 1860 occupation of Tetouan. Such political 
transformation was a consequence of various interrelated processes, amongst which I 
have highlighted three main elements: the Spaniards’ acknowledgement of the peril of a 
civil strife that a prolonged occupation of Tetouan and the occupation of other Moroccan 
territories could lead to, and which would complicate the venture; connected to the 
Spanish perception of Moroccans’ ‘unconquerability’; and the increasing empathy and 
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self-identification with Tetouanis that the first-hand experience produced in those 
Spaniards. 
Makhzan authorities and Tetouani urbanites mobilized internal and external 
menaces to coerce the Spaniards. They referred to Spain’s second-order world power and 
to the British backing of the Makhzan. They also built upon Europeans’ prejudices 
regarding Moroccan political disunity and ‘anarchy,’ rural tribesmen’s ‘ferocity’ or the 
extreme religious ‘fanaticism,’ which represented a smart strategy that limited the 
Spanish colonial ambitions – at least in the short run. Such a strategy would eventually 
become a double-edged sword, as in the long run European powers used those claims to 
legitimize colonial intervention. While historiographical (post)colonial narratives have 
tended to uniquely ascribe the construction of such tropes to ‘the colonizers,’ I have 
argued that Moroccan authorities and people were active agents in their inception and 
spread. This is not, of course, valid all the colonial discourses. For example, the 
dichotomy between bled al-makhzan versus bled al-siba, which divided Morocco on the 
basis of a territorially-defined allegiance to the Makhzan and the rebellion against it, was 
transferred from French Algeria onto French and, to a lesser extent, Spanish Morocco.   
The central claim of the article is that the colonized populations and politics 
shaped the course of the colonial events. Without losing sight of the uneven imperial 
macro-structures in which they operated, this article suggests that the colonized 
populations were not located out of history, and the local political notions and practices 
are to be acknowledged as key in the processes which conditioned colonialism. In the 
preceding pages, I have held that the notion of the rural ‘savagery,’ the contested nature 
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of the power and the legitimacy of sultan, and religio-spiritual-cum-political practices 
such as inkimāsh outstandingly shaped the nature of the mid nineteenth-century Spanish 
colonial intervention. I have also emphasized the Spaniards’ imitation, ventriloquization, 
identification, admiration and appropriation of Moroccan discourses, practices, and 
attitudes, which show the chief role that different categories of Moroccans played a in the 
Spanish occupation of Tetouan, both individually and collectively. 
Yet the political transformation of the Spaniards to which the Moroccans 
contributed did not ultimately undermine the larger colonial scope of the venture. The 
pragmatic restraint that both the civilian and the military Spaniards advocated weighted 
Spain’s colonial limitations and ambitions. The pacifist theses that the so-called ‘apostles 
of peace’ purported in their chronicles and the moderate positions that the chiefs of the 
Army of Africa advocated, partly due to the influence of both Makhzan envoys and 
Tetouani civilians, were not well received by the colonialist sectors of peninsular Spain. 
In the long run, however, the former’s pragmatism paved the way for consolidating the 
colonial penetration into Morocco, which was in turn left suffocated in a rampant 
economic crisis and a political entanglement that would lead into popular protests 
throughout the following decades (Sebti 1991; Bazzaz 2010, 50–81).  
Not only Spain took advantage of the infrastructures set in place during the 
occupation of Tetouan, however. Although the British had opposed and limited the reach 
of the Spanish war on Tetouan, the 1861 treaty benefitted the British intervention in 
Moroccan customs houses throughout the second half of the nineteenth century. Besides, 
the Alliance Israélite Universelle, founded in Paris in 1860, was able to establish its first 
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worldwide school in Tetouan in December 1862 party because the Spanish occupation of 
Tetouan had already summoned a community of Jews who had attended school (Cohn 
and Munk 1927, 2–3).  
Complex historical processes such as Spanish colonialism in Morocco are 
characterized by dynamic power structures and systems, which can only be grasped by 
acknowledging the political contradictions, ambivalences, and dissensions. To 
provincialize Europe, as Dipesh Chakrabarty (2000) famously inspired us to do, I have 
come to believe, is to deal with a historical Europe – thus, a non-almighty Europe. To 
provincialize Europe is neither to avoid the specific trajectories of its expansion, nor to 
fetishize them (Cooper 2005, 30), and that includes acknowledging the role of the 
colonized people and politics in shaping colonialism. The local realm, I have argued, is a 
productive site to pursue such an endeavour. 
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